UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

| UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |) 2:05-CR-0121-RCJ-RJJ |
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| Plaintiff, |) 2:03-CR-0121-RCJ-RJJ |
| vs. | ORDER |
| ROBERT DAVID KAHRE, et al., |) |
| Defendants. |) |

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Joel Axberg's Objections to Magistrate Judge Johnston's Order Regarding Motion for Recusal. (#1252.) Defendants Robert Kahre and Lori Kahre filed Motions for Joinder to Defendant Axberg's Motion. (*See* #1279, #1295.) The Court has considered the Motions, the pleadings on file, and oral argument on behalf of the parties and hereby issues the following Order.

BACKGROUND

On May 2, 2006, Defendant Alexander Loglia filed his Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and Notice of Possible Source of Judicial Bias and Prejudice. (#445.) Defendant Robert Kahre filed his Motion for Recusal of Judge Johnston on May 5, 2006. (#454.) Defendant Loglia's Motion called for an immediate evidentiary hearing to investigate alleged incidents demonstrating Judge Johnston's improper actions with regard to the case at bar. Defendant Kahre's Motion sought the immediate recusal of Judge Johnston. Judge Johnston then held an evidentiary hearing on May 15, 2006. On April 30, 2007, Judge Johnston issued a written Order

denying both Defendant Loglia's and Defendant Kahre's Motions. (#1209.) Defendants now object to Judge Johnston's Order and ask this Court to "issue an Order of Recusal regarding the Magistrate Judge, the Honorable Robert J. Johnston." (*See* #1252 at 11.)

DISCUSSION

I. Defendants' Request for Recusal

In their Objections and Request for Recusal, Defendants proffer four main reasons why this Court must order Judge Johnston's recusal: (1) the Magistrate Judge improperly presided over the evidentiary hearing; (2) the Magistrate Judge conducted the evidentiary hearing in a manner demonstrating improper bias; (3) the Magistrate Judge had knowledge of disputed facts; and (4) the facts underlying the Magistrate Judge's participation in this case created an appearance of impropriety. For the reasons stated at oral argument, and for the additional reasons stated herein, the Court denies Defendants' Objections and accompanying Request for Recusal.

A. Standard for Recusal

A judge must "disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). In addition, a judge must also disqualify himself where he has "personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding . . ." *Id.* at § 455(b)(1). Section 455 does not specify the procedures used and is self-enforcing on the part of the judge. As a federal judge is presumed to be impartial, a substantial burden is imposed on the party claiming bias or prejudice to show that this is not the case. *See, e.g., United States v. Zagari*, 419 F. Supp. 494, 506 n.30 (N.D. Cal. 1976). A judge should recuse himself when "a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might be reasonably questioned." *United States v. Hernandez*, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453 (1997).

A. Presiding Over the Evidentiary Hearing

First, Defendants argue that as a matter of law Judge Johnston was required to refer the evidentiary hearing to another judge. Two federal statutes govern recusal: 28 U.S.C. § 144 and 28 U.S.C. § 455. Defendants' Motions make clear that they relied on § 455 in arguing for Judge Johnston's recusal. The cases to which Defendants cite in their Objections to support their argument that Judge Johnston erred in failing to refer the recusal matter to a different judge relate to § 144. Section 144 includes a provision for assigning the motion to another judge for review only after the first judge determines that the motion is timely and that the affidavit is legally sufficient. Section 455 has no such requirement. Indeed, as noted above, § 455 "puts the judge under a *self-enforcing* obligation to recuse himself where legal grounds exist for disqualification." *United States v. Jaramillo*, 745 F.2d 1245, 1248 (9th Cir. 1984) (emphasis added). Under § 455(b)(1), a judge is required to disqualify himself if he has a personal bias or prejudice against a party. For the reasons stated below, Defendants fail to establish the requisite showing of personal bias or prejudice, as well as the appearance of such. Thus, as a matter of law, Judge Johnston was not required to refer the hearing to another judge.

B. Bias or Prejudice

As noted above, a judge must recuse himself due to personal bias or prejudice. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(1). As a federal judge is presumed to be impartial, a substantial burden is imposed on the party claiming bias or prejudice to show that this is not the case. *See, e.g., Zagari*, 419 F. Supp. at 506 n.30. According to Defendants, Judge Johnston's bias or prejudice is "well documented and was further evidenced by the manner in which the evidentiary hearing was conducted."

First, Defendants argue that Judge Johnston acted "angrier and angrier" as the hearing progressed. Thus, Defendants argue Judge Johnston was biased or prejudiced against

Defendants. (May 9, 2007, Hr'g Tr. at 15 [hereinafter Tr.].) In response to the Court's inquiry regarding the subject of Judge Johnston's anger, counsel for Defendant Axberg said that Judge Johnston was becoming angrier and angrier at "the whole subject matter; the entire subject matter; the hearing." (*Id.* at 15:22-23.) Defendants also stated that Judge Johnston acted rudely toward counsel for Defendant Robert Kahre in asking counsel "not to make that face at him." (*Id.* at 18:12.)

While Judge Johnston may have become "angry" or irritated during the evidentiary hearing, any such emotions were directed toward defense counsel's comments and arguments. Nothing in the transcripts indicates that Judge Johnston was angry at the actual Defendants themselves. For example, Judge Johnston ruled on several objections yet counsel continued to disregard and argue over Judge Johnston's rulings. Moreover, counsel for Defendants refused to answer some of Judge Johnston's questions. Any anger, lack of patience, or frustration was clearly aimed at counsels' methodology, not at the individual Defendants. Personal bias or prejudice, to require recusal or remand to a different judge, must be against the actual party, not against the attorney or the attorney's methods. *See United States v. Burt*, 765 F.2d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir. 1985); *see also* 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455. Thus, Defendants' "anger" argument fails.

Second, Defendants claim that Judge Johnston's delay in issuing rulings and orders evidences prejudice and bias against Defendants. While courts at times unfortunately procrastinate or otherwise issue rulings in a less than timely manner, this fact alone is not sufficient to establish bias or prejudice requiring recusal.

Third, Defendants argue that Judge Johnston's acquaintance, through his church, with Government witness Don Herman evidences Judge Johnston's personal interest and bias in this case. According to Defendants, "[t]he evidentiary hearing was nothing more than a forum for the Magistrate Judge to exert his leadership role in the Church over the material witness at the

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hearing in order to solicit the testimony the Magistrate Judge wanted on the record." (#1252 at 7.) Mere membership in the same faith or church is not sufficient to justify recusal. See In re Mccarthey, 368 F.3d 1266, 1270 (10th Cir. 2004). Both Judge Johnston and Mr. Herman are members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the "LDS" church). The LDS church is divided into geographical areas called "stakes." Each stake has roughly 5,000-8,000 members. Currently, there are twenty five stakes in the Las Vegas valley. Each stake is headed by a Stake Presidency consisting of a Stake President and two counselors. Each stake is further divided into smaller geographical units called wards. Each stake has roughly five to ten wards. While several wards might meet in the same meetinghouse, their meetings are held separately and generally without interaction. At the time of the evidentiary hearing at issue, Judge Johnston was a counselor in Mr. Herman's stake presidency, but of a different ward or congregation. As such he may meet periodically with members of the stake, including Mr. Herman, for ecclesiastical-type interviews or meetings. Thus, on infrequent occasion, Judge Johnston and Mr. Herman could have met or interacted in church settings. However, Defendants' mere allegation, without any proof here, that Judge Johnston used his leadership role in his church to influence Mr. Herman's testimony cannot provide basis for recusal. See Singer v. Wadman, 745 F.2d 606, 608 (10th Cir. 1984) (refusing to disqualify a judge, who was LDS, when plaintiff challenged "the theocratic power structure of Utah").

Defendants further allege that Judge Johnston and Mr. Herman improperly discussed the case at bar in church settings. However, as analyzed below, Defendants fail to introduce evidence supporting this theory. For the reasons stated above and at oral argument, Defendants fail to establish bias or prejudice on the part of Judge Johnston. Contrary to Defendants' allegations, the Court has found that no conversations about the case occurred during an interview between Judge Johnston and Mr. Herman; and in fact, no such interview occurred at

the time alleged according to the documentation referenced in the transcript of hearing before Judge Johnston. Rather, a mention of Mr. Kahre's name may have been raised only in passing, if at all, during brief encounter outside the church on that occasion.

C. Personal Knowledge or Interest

Defendants also contend that Judge Johnston has personal interest and knowledge in this case requiring recusal. Defendants point to two meetings between Judge Johnston and Mr. Herman as evidence of Judge Johnston's personal knowledge and interest. The first meeting occurred after Defendant Robert Kahre's arraignment on May 20, 2005. The second meeting occurred at a LDS church meetinghouse. Defendants allege that Judge Johnston discussed this case with Mr. Herman at those meetings and asked Mr. Herman questions regarding Defendant David Kahre. The only evidence Defendants proffer to support their argument is an affidavit submitted by Mr. Kahre wherein Defendant Kahre summarizes statements allegedly told to him by Mr. Herman. According to this affidavit, Mr. Herman allegedly told Mr. Kahre that Judge Johnston had discussed the case with Mr. Herman.

The evidence in this case does not support Defendant Kahre's affidavit. At the evidentiary hearing, Mr. Herman testified that the only discussion he ever had regarding Defendants with Judge Johnston took place in Judge Johnston's chambers when Judge Johnston invited Mr. Herman and his wife back to say hello. On the day in question, Judge Johnston recognized Mr. Herman and his wife in the courtroom gallery. As noted above, the Hermans and Judge Johnston were members of the same church or stake, but not of the same ward or congregation. Accordingly, Judge Johnston invited them back to say hello. During their conversation, Judge Johnston inquired as to why they were visiting his courtroom and if Mr. Herman knew Defendant Kahre. According to Mr. Herman's testimony, other than that question regarding Mr. Kahre's identity, he and Judge Johnston never discussed Defendant Kahre or any

aspects of the case. To constitute recusal, Defendants must show that Judge Johnston personally knew the Defendants pre-indictment, knew some facts concerning the case from extrajudicial sources, or had bias or prejudice against Defendants, whether stemming from extrajudicial or judicially acquired sources. Mr. Herman testified in direct contradiction to Defendant Kahre's affidavit that he never discussed the case with Judge Johnston. (*See* #508 at 31-93.) Indeed, Mr. Ray, another witness called to testify at the evidentiary hearing, confirmed Mr. Herman's testimony. Mr. Herman allegedly informed Defendant Kahre about the conversations he had with Judge Johnston during a lunch meeting with Defendant Kahre and Mr. Ray. Mr. Ray testified that Mr. Herman never told them about any alleged meetings with Judge Johnston to discuss the case. (*See id.* at 102-118.)

Defendants have failed to demonstrate any evidence of personal knowledge or interest on the part of Judge Johnston. There is no showing of extrajudicial sources of knowledge. Judge Johnston did not know Mr. Kahre before this case started. The Court finds that other than the simple inquiry as to whether Mr. Herman knew Defendant Kahre, Judge Johnston did not have any conversations with Mr. Herman regarding the trial or Mr. Kahre. The only evidence to which Defendants cite is the hearsay containing affidavit provided by Mr. Kahre. Defendants admit they do not have any evidence other than these hearsay statements to support a finding of Judge Johnston's alleged personal knowledge or interest in this case. (*See* Tr. at 32:10-11.) The person who allegedly made the statements denied them in court under oath. To the contrary, more than one witness testified under oath at the evidentiary hearing that those conversations never took place. Judge Johnston simply had no knowledge about this case or the Defendants prior to trial. He had no particular animus toward Defendants or those involved in tax cases generally. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above and at oral argument, the Court finds that

Defendants have failed to carry their burden in establishing Judge Johnston's personal knowledge or interest in this case.

D. Appearance of Impropriety

Defendants state that the appearance of impropriety is established by the fact that Judge Johnston had personal knowledge of disputed facts. (*See* #1252 at 10.) However, as noted above, a federal judge is presumed to be impartial, and therefore a substantial burden is imposed on the party claiming bias or prejudice to show that this is not the case. *See, e.g., United States v. Zagari*, 419 F. Supp. 494, 506 n.30 (N.D. Cal. 1976). For the reasons stated above, Defendants have failed to carry this burden.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above and at oral argument, Defendants have failed to carry their burden to establish bias, prejudice, or personal knowledge with respect to Judge Johnston. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Objections to Magistrate Judge's Recusal Order and Request for Recusal (#1252) is *denied*. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motions for Joinder (#1279 and #1295) are *granted*.

DATED: July 13, 2007

ROBERT C. JONES

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE